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ABSTRACT 
Using Danish register and survey data, we examine the effect of a national graded return-to-
work program on the probability of sick-listed workers returning to regular working hours. 
During program participation, the worker receives the normal hourly wage for the hours 
worked and sickness benefit for the hours off work. When the worker‟s health improves, 
working hours are increased until the sick-listed worker is able to work regular hours. Taking 
account of unobserved differences between program participants and non-participants, we 
find that participation in the program significantly increases the probability of returning to 
regular working hours. 
 
JEL codes: C41, I18, J64.   
  3 
Introduction 
Work disability inflicts huge economic and human costs on society. In a study of 19 OECD 
countries, on average 14 percent of the working-age population reported being disabled 
(OECD, 2003). While 71 percent of the adult population of non-disabled people was 
employed, this figure was only 44 percent among people with disabilities (Ibid). In response 
to disability-related labor market inactivity policy makers, administrators, and researchers 
invest many resources in finding ways of improving the labor market attachment of disabled 
people. Economists have especially focused on how vocational rehabilitation (e.g., 
Berkowitz, 1988; Dean et al. 1999; Aakvik et al. 2005) and economic incentives of cash 
benefit programs influence disabled peoples‟ labor market status (e.g., Meyer et al. 1995; 
Oleinick et al., 1996; Johnson et al., 1998; Galizzi and Boden, 2003). In contrast, economists 
have only to a very limited extent studied how workplace accommodations, including graded 
return to work, affect the labor market attachment of disabled people. 
  This paper studies how a national program of graded return to work affects the 
probability of long-term sick-listed workers returning to regular working hours, i.e., pre-sick 
leave hours. The program allows sick-listed workers to return to work at reduced working 
hours. When the worker‟s health improves, the working hours are gradually increased until 
the sick-listed worker is able to work regular working hours. During the period of reduced 
working hours, the participant receives his or her normal hourly wage for the hours worked 
(e.g., 20 hours per week) and sickness benefit for the hours off work (e.g., 17 hours a week). 
The sick-listed worker is expected to leave the program and return to regular working hours 
as quickly as possible. 
  To our knowledge no one has studied the employment effects of a national graded 
return-to-work program. In terms of population and workplace intervention, the Canadian    
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study of Butler et al. (1995) is the most comparable to our study. However, in contrast to 
Butler et al. (1995), we adjust for unobserved heterogeneity. 
  Using data on 934 workers who were sick-listed for more than eight weeks, we 
simultaneously estimate the duration until the sick-listed workers enter the graded return-to-
work program and the duration until they return to regular working hours.  
  We do find that program participation significantly increases the probability of sick-
listed workers returning to regular working hours. Furthermore, our findings illustrate the 
importance of correcting for unobserved heterogeneity. Without such correction the program 
effect is significantly overestimated. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of 
the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the Danish sick leave policy, while Section 4 
outlines how the graded return-to-work program may affect the labor market attachment of 
sick-listed workers. Section 5, describes the data, and Section 6 explains our econometric 
model and how we identify the treatment effect. Section 7 presents our findings and the 
results of robustness checks to our empirical model. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
  The Danish graded return-to-work program is a workplace intervention: Sick-listed 
workers return to their pre-sick leave job on temporarily reduced working hours. Three 
systematic literature reviews of studies from 1975 to 2005 conclude that workplace 
interventions significantly increase sick-listed workers‟ chance of returning to work (Krause 
et al. 1998; Krause and Lund 2003; Franche et al. 2005). These findings indicate that the 
Danish graded return-to-work program may also increase sick-listed workers‟ labor market    
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attachment. However, there are several reasons for why the findings of previous studies 
cannot be generalized to the Danish program. 
  First, in contrast to the Danish program, the vast majority of previous studies concern 
specially designed programs restricted to a limited population of disabled workers (e.g., Gice 
and Tompkins, 1989; Loisel et al. 1997; Bernacki et al. 2000; Arnetz et al. 2003). These 
programs are often designed by medical or occupational experts, who instruct trained 
professionals in how to implement the specific program. Consequently, the findings of these 
programs may not be valid in a national setting. 
  Second, as Franche et al. (2005:628) note, studies of sufficient scientific quality all 
concern disabled workers with musculoskeletal disorders. Consequently, the findings of these 
studies may not be valid for programs that also include workers with non-musculoskeletal 
disorders.  
  Third, nearly all previous studies concern programs with several interventions, e.g., 
workplace adaptations in combination with worksite ergonomic visits and early employer-
contact with the sick-listed worker. This broad scope makes it difficult to make inferences 
about the effectiveness of a specific intervention such as reduced working hours (Franche et 
al. 2005:627). 
  With these qualifiers in mind, the study of Butler et al. (1995) appears of most 
relevance to our study. Their study does not focus on a specially designed program restricted 
to a limited population of disabled workers, and they provide separate estimates of different 
workplace accommodations, including reduced working hours. Their study interviewed 1,850 
injured workers with permanent partial impairments in Ontario, Canada, between 3 and 15 
years after injury. Modified equipment, light work loads, and reduced working hours affected 
the workers‟ labor market attachment after injury. Thus workers returning to reduced hours 
had significantly more stable labor market attachment than workers who did not have their    
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hours reduced. This finding suggests that the Danish graded return-to-work program may 
increase sick-listed workers‟ chances of resuming work under ordinary conditions. 
  Despite these important similarities, important differences hamper direct comparison of 
our study with the study of Butler et al. (1995). One difference concerns the outcome 
variable. While we study return-to-work durations, Butler et al. (1995) studied employment 
patterns. Another difference concerns the treatment variable: We study a temporary reduction 
of working hours, whereas no demands with respect to the duration of the reduction in 
working hours were reported in the Canadian study. Furthermore, in contrast to the Canadian 
treatment, the Danish workplace accommodations take place under a formal program. As the 
program regulates the sick-listed workers‟ economic compensation during the period on 
reduced hours the program may affect the duration of this period, thereby affecting the time 
before return to regular working hours (see section 4).  
  Finally, Butler et al. (1995) did not correct for unobserved differences between workers 
who received workplace accommodations and workers who did not, meaning that the 
estimated employment effects may be biased. In contrast to their study, we adjust for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
3. The Danish sick leave policy 
 
  The Danish sickness benefit program covers wage earners, self-employed people, and 
people receiving unemployment insurance benefits. The program replaces wages up to a 
ceiling that equals the maximum unemployment benefit. Often employers raise the benefits to 
meet the wage level. Sick-listed individuals can normally receive sickness benefits for up to 
one year within a period of 18 months.    
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  By law the municipalities are obliged to followup all cases within eight weeks after the 
first day of the sick leave. Thereafter, the municipality must perform followup assessments 
every fourth week in complicated cases and every eighth week in uncomplicated cases. The 
municipal caseworker must verify that the sick-listed individual is eligible for the benefit, i.e., 
is work incapacitated, and help the sick-listed individual to return to work as quickly as 
possible. The followup assessment must rely on updated medical, social, and vocational 
information, and take place in cooperation with the sick-listed individual and other relevant 
agents, such as the employer, medical experts, vocational rehabilitation institutions, unions, 
and labor market experts. 
  To promote a swift return to work, the caseworker can apply various vocational 
rehabilitation measures. These measures include job counseling, test of work capacity, wage-
subsidized job-training, courses, educational measures, economic support to workplace 
accommodations, aids, and graded return to work. If the sick-listed worker, despite medical 
treatment and vocational rehabilitation, is unable to return to ordinary employment, the 
municipality may refer him or her to a permanently wage-subsidized job under special 
conditions, e.g., reduced working hours and special job tasks (fleksjob). To be eligible for a 
fleksjob, the sick-listed worker must have a permanently reduced work capacity of at least 50 
percent. If the sick-listed individual cannot return to a fleksjob, the municipality may award a 
disability benefit. 
  The graded return-to-work measure allows the sick-listed worker to return to the pre-
sick leave job at reduced working hours. During the period on reduced working hours, the 
worker receives his or her normal hourly wage for the hours worked and sickness benefit for 
the hours off work. The sick-listed worker is supposed to return to regular working hours as 
soon as possible, i.e., with full employer-financed wage payment and pre-sick leave working 
hours. Normally, the graded return-to-work period cannot exceed the one-year sickness    
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benefit period. Graded return to work must take place in agreement among the employer, the 
sick-listed worker, and the municipality. In practice, a graded return to work may be 
established in one of two ways: The municipality may assess that the sick-listed worker is 
able to work part-time and therefore ask the sick-listed worker to agree with the employer 
about graded return to work. The sick-listed worker and the employer may also make such an 
agreement on their own initiative and then ask the municipality to approve it. 
 
4. Possible effects of graded return to work 
 
  From an economic perspective, a graded return-to-work program may yield positive 
employment outcomes because of human capital effects. Assuming that a person‟s total labor 
market inactivity results in the degeneration of an individual‟s skills and qualifications, 
graded return to work may slow down or hinder such loss of skills and qualifications. A sick-
listed individual working reduced hours will therefore have more human capital and better 
employment prospects than an otherwise identical fully sick-listed worker. 
  However, such positive employment effects may be hampered by perverse economic 
incentives of the graded return-to-work program. Compared to fully sick-listed workers, 
workers on graded return to work have smaller economic incentives to return to regular 
working hours. The reason is that during program participation, the workers are working only 
part-time but still receiving an income (wage payments plus supplementary sickness benefit) 
close to the pre-sick leave wage. By contrast, fully sick-listed workers receive the sick leave 
benefit.
1 Furthermore, if the program makes sick-listed workers return to graded work before 
they have recovered sufficiently, their health problems may increase, forcing them to 
                                                 
1 However, in general white-collar workers and some skilled workers receive full wage during sick leave. For 
these workers the program has no economic incentive effects.     
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becoming fully sick-listed again (Pransky et al. 2002). Consequently, in certain cases the 
program may be expected to prolong the sick leave period. 
 




  We use a matched survey-register sample of workers sick-listed for more than eight 
weeks.
2 The sample of 1,220 sickness benefit cases that were closed through January 1 to 
July 31, 2006 was randomly drawn from 39 out of 271 municipalities. The municipalities 
were stratified with respect to size and geographical location. The 39 municipalities were 
asked to fill out a small questionnaire about each of the 1,220 sick-listed workers. These data 
comprise information about case management activities, including the date of the graded 
return to work. Information was gathered for 1,086 persons (89 percent). 
  We matched the survey data to two types of register information. From the national 
register of payments of sickness benefits (KMD), we gathered information about the first and 
the last day of the sick leave and about the reason for benefit closure. The information in the 
KMD register originates from the municipalities‟ payments of sickness benefits. From 
Statistic Denmark‟s “Integrated Database for Labor Market Research” and “the Database of 
                                                 
2 That the sick-listed workers in this study are sampled after eight weeks of sick leave may bias the estimated 
treatment effect. If the graded return-to-work program has a positive employment effect, some program 
participants may not be included in our sample because they returned to regular working hours before the ninth 
week. In contrast, other early program participants will be in the sample because they did not return to regular 
working hours before the ninth week. Consequently, program participants with a low return-to-work potential 
will be overrepresented in the sample and our estimate of the treatment effect will therefore be a lower bound of 
the true treatment effect. We return to this issue in Section 7.1.    
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Health Care Services” we collected data about socio-demographic characteristics, previous 
labor market attachment, and the number of visits to both general practitioners and specialists 
before the sick leave. The register data was obtained for 1,083 persons. 
  We restrict our analysis to 1,019 workers who were under 60 years old and fully work 
incapacitated at the onset of the sick leave period. We exclude 85 workers with missing or 
inconsistent information on the timing of graded return to work, leaving 934 persons in our 
analytical sample. 
   
5.2 Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
 
  We use KMD‟s register of payments of sickness benefits to construct the dependent 
variable measuring the time until first return to regular working hours. We consider a person 
to have returned to regular working hours when the sickness benefit case is closed, because 
the sick-listed worker reported ready to work pre-sick leave working hours. This indirect 
measurement may introduce measurement error.  
  We treat sickness benefit cases that are terminated for all other reasons as right 
censored when payment of the benefit ends. Other reasons to stop benefit payments include 
receipt of disability benefit, employment in a permanently wage subsidized job (fleksjob), 
exhaustion of the legal benefit period, participation in vocational rehabilitation, temporary 
suspension of benefit payment because of holidays, and termination because the municipality 
decides that the sick-listed worker is not work incapacitated. Receipt of disability benefit and 
employment in a fleksjob are absorbing exit states that prevent people from returning to 
ordinary employment at a later time. Thus estimating a random effects competing risk model 
(van den Berg 2001) with two exit states, i.e., returning to regular working hours and 
disability benefit or fleksjob employment, is appropriate. Unfortunately, we were unable to    
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identify the random effect distribution for this model. Therefore, we only work with one exit 
state (returning to regular working hours), and we right censor all other exits. 
  Six hundred and twenty-nine sick-listed workers (67 percent) returned to regular 
working hours after an average of 20 weeks. 
  We use the municipal survey data to construct two graded return-to-work variables. One 
variable measures whether the individual enrolls into the program. The variable is coded as 0 
until program enrollment, 1 during participation, and 0 after program participation. Another 
variable measures whether the individual has left the program. The variable is 0 until 
program termination and 1 afterwards. 
  Two hundred and sixty-five (28 percent) of the sick-listed workers participated in the 
graded return-to-work program after an average of 16 weeks of sick leave. The graded return-
to-work period lasted an average of 11 weeks. Of those who participated in the program, 20 
percent ended the program without returning to regular working hours, i.e., they stopped 
program participation and reported fully sick-listed again.  
  The sick-listed worker‟s health condition is measured in two variables: The number of 
visits the year before the present sick leave to: (1) General practitioners and (2) specialists.
3 
The socio-demographic characteristics constitute gender, age, cohabitation status, citizenship, 
educational background and previous employment experience, measured as the number of 
full-time equivalent years of employment since 1964. These variables are also measured for 
the year before the present sick leave. Finally, we include the regional unemployment rate as 
a proxy for regional labor market demand fluctuations, which may influence the probability 
                                                 
3 We lack information about the sick leave diagnosis. As the diagnosis could potentially affect the probability of 
both program enrolment and returning to regular working hours, this could bias the estimated program effect. 
However, Høgelund (2008) finds no significant association between medical diagnosis and participation in the 
graded return-to-work program.    
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of returning to work. This time-varying variable, measured as the lagged unemployment rate, 
follows changes in the observed unemployment rate every sixth month.
4 
 
5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
  To get a first impression of whether the graded return-to-work program has a positive 
impact on sick-listed workers‟ chance of returning to regular working hours, Figure 1 shows 
the unadjusted hazard rates to regular working hours for program participants and for non-
participants.  
 
<<<<< Figure 1 >>>>>> 
 
Figure 1 clearly shows that sick-listed workers participating in the program have a 
significantly higher hazard rate to regular working hours than sick-listed workers who do not 
participate. In other words, the program appears to increase the sick-listed workers‟ labor 
market attachment. However, there are two reasons why the apparent program effect in 
Figure 1 may be biased. The figure does not take into account that some participants leave the 
program before they return to regular working hours. Therefore, the effect shown in Figure 1 
is an average of the effect of being enrolled in the program and of having ended the program 
without returning to regular working hours. More important, the graphs in Figure 1 do not 
take into account that program participants may have better a priori employment prospects 
than non-participants. If, for example, program participation presupposes a certain health 
                                                 
4 The variable is based on information about the quarterly unemployment rate. The average of the 
unemployment rate in the two quarters before the beginning of a sick leave period is allowed to affect the 
probability of returning to work during the first 26 weeks of the sick leave. Similarly, the average 
unemployment rate during the two first quarters of the sick leave period is allowed to affect the probability of 
returning to work during the next 26 weeks, etc.    
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status, program participants will be healthier than non-participants. Consequently, if health 
status affects the probability of returning to regular working hours, the program effect in 
Figure 1 will be upward biased.  
  Table 1, which shows means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables, 
suggests that there are observed differences between participants and non-participants. 
 
<<< Table 1 >>> 
 
The sick-listed workers participating in the program are more often females, more often have 
a secondary education, are more often living with a spouse, and have more previous labor 
market experience than non-participants. If, for example, previous labor market experience 
influences the chance of returning to regular working hours, then to obtain an unbiased 
estimate of the program effect we must correct for previous labor market experience and 
other observed and unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
6. The econometric model and identification strategy 
 
6.1. The econometric model 
  We use a discrete mixed-proportional-hazard-rate model to simultaneously estimate the 
sick-listed worker‟s transition to graded return to work and to regular working hours. The 
unobserved heterogeneity is captured in a discrete distribution with a finite number of mass 
points. This procedure allows the random effects of the two durations to be interdependent 
without imposing assumptions about the structure of the dependence. 
  The transition to graded return-to-work is given by a logit model with time-dependent 
constant terms:    
  14 
1
1 1 1 1
11
1 1 1 1
exp






P D t d
x
    (1) 
where 
      t is the time after the first day of the sick leave measured in weeks 
      1




  In addition, 1 x is a vector of variables affecting the hazard to graded return to work, 
and 1 is a corresponding row vector of regression coefficients. The parameter 1t  is a time-
specific intercept term measuring duration dependence in the hazard rate to graded return to 
work, and 1is an unobserved random effect. We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is 
independent of observed variables and time invariant. Conditional on the transition to the 
graded return-to-work program, we also assume that the transition out of the program before 
returning to regular working hours is exogenous.
5 Ending participation in the program is 
indicated by: 
2




  The transition to regular working hours is described by the following logit model with 
time-dependent constant terms: 
3()
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P D t d
d d x
  (2) 
                                                 
5 As the selection into the program may differ from the selection out of the program, we should model both 
selection processes to obtain an unbiased estimate of the program effect. However, we were unable to model the 
selection out of the program because relatively few persons leave the program before returning to regular 
working hours. Sick-listed workers leaving the program without having returned to regular working hours will 
probably have fewer unobserved resources than other program participants, meaning that we may underestimate 
the program effect,  2, for sick-listed workers leaving the program.    
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where: 
3




and 2 x are observed variables with 2 as the two corresponding row vectors of regression 
coefficients. The coefficients  12 and  measure the effect of entering and ending the graded 
return-to-work program on the hazard rate to ordinary employment. The parameter 2t is a 
time-specific intercept term measuring duration dependence in the hazard rate to regular 
working hours, and the coefficient 2 measures the unobserved effects in the hazard rate. 
  Following Heckman and Singer (1984) for the univariate case and van den Berg et al. 
(2002) for the multivariate extension, we assume that  12 , takes on a finite number of 
values, the first being (0,0) and subsequently  11 12 , , 21 22 , ,…. The values (mass points) 
are distributed with probability 0,0 p
11 12 , p , 
21 22 , p ,…., with 
12 , 1
jj j e e p . Both mass points 
and probabilities are estimated as parameters in the likelihood function. Assuming a finite 
number of mass points, see Frühwirt-Schnatter (2006), standard likelihood regularity 
conditions holds. 
  Denoting the discrete duration until returning to regular working hours or censoring as 
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  This likelihood is optimized with respect to the regression parameters in the two logit 
models for the time until entering the graded return-to-work program (1) and until returning 
to full-time work (2) and the parameters capturing the discrete mixture distribution of 
unobserved random effect. By allowing the random effects to be correlated, the model jointly 
determines the selection process into the program and the process of returning to full time    
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work. Consequently, we take into account selection effects as they are conditioned upon in 
the model, meaning that the estimates of program participation have a causal interpretation. 
  In the discussion of our results, we test whether the random effects are time invariant, 
cf. the Robustness Checks section. In Appendix A we outline a model with time-varying 
random effects. 
 
6.2. Identification strategy  
  Researchers often use the instrumental variables (IV) method to obtain an unbiased 
treatment effect. This method presupposes the existence of a variable that influences the 
assignment to the treatment but that does not influence the outcome variable, except 
indirectly through the treatment. However, this assumption is often difficult to fulfill. Using 
the IV method is also a problem in this study, because all the variables measuring the sick-
listed worker's characteristics may influence not only program participation but also the 
subsequent probability of returning to regular working hours. 
  To obtain an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect, we use the timing-of-event 
approach. In their seminal work, Abbring and van den Berg (2003) show that if individuals 
cannot anticipate the exact timing of the treatment, the joint mixed proportional hazard rate 
model of both the duration until program participation and the event of interest yields an 
unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. In such a model, the information about variation in 
the timing of both the treatment and the realization of the outcome is sufficient to measure the 
treatment effect without bias. In our study, the no-anticipation assumption means that the 
sick-listed workers, at the beginning of the sick leave period, do not know the exact timing of 
their enrolment in the graded return-to-work program. We believe that this assumption is met, 
as it seems unlikely that sick-listed workers should be able to forecast their health status with 
such precision that they can determine when their future health condition has improved so    
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much that it makes graded work feasible. Furthermore, a sick-listed worker‟s participation in 
the program demands the employer‟s and the municipal case manager‟s approval. Thus, even 
if the sick-listed workers were able to forecast when their health condition would allow them 





  Table 2 shows the results of the random effects hazard rate model of program enrolment 
and of returning to regular working hours. Table A1 in Appendix B shows the results of a 




  There is a systematic selection of sick-listed workers to the graded return-to-work 
program. The selection is influenced both by observed and unobserved characteristics. 
Looking at the observed characteristics, we see that sick-listed workers with few previous 
visits to the general practitioner, low age, a post-secondary education, and much previous 
labor market experience have a high probability both of participating in the program and of 
returning to regular working hours. These findings suggest that the sick-listed workers‟ health 
condition (visits to the general practitioner) and human capital (educational attainment and 
labor market experience) influence the probability of program participation. As these 
variables have a similar effect on the probability of returning to regular working hours, we 
may conclude that individuals with good employment prospects have a high probability of 
participating in the graded return-to-work program.    
  18 
  Furthermore, low regional unemployment increases the chance of participating in the 
program, suggesting that labor shortage may induce employers to retain sick-listed workers 
through the graded return-to-work program. 
  Like the observed variables, the unobserved heterogeneity components also suggest that 
program participants have good employment prospects. Twenty-seven percent of the sick-
listed workers have unobserved characteristics that significantly increase the probability both 
of participating in the program and of returning to regular working hours. The random effects 
indicate that this selection is strong and significant: The coefficient to program participation 
is 0.762 with a p-value of 0.014 and the coefficient to regular working hours is 2.735 with a 
p-value of 0.000. These coefficients correspond to risk ratios of 2.1 and 15.4, respectively.  
  We find a significant and positive effect of the graded return-to-work program on the 
probability of returning to regular working hours. The coefficient of the variable measuring 
the effect during program participation is 0.430 with a p-value of 0.011. Consequently, in 
each week during program participation the participants have a 54 percent higher probability 
of returning to regular working hours than sick-listed workers who do not participate. This 
effect supports the hypothesis that participation in the graded return-to-work program may 
reduce or hinder the loss of skills and qualifications, a loss that otherwise may occur when 
illness results in total inactivity. 
  The effect of having ended the program without returning to regular working hours is 
positive but insignificant at a 10 percent significance level. This finding contradicts the 
hypothesis that program participation may increase some participants‟ health problems and 
thus reduce their future labor market attachment. Together, these findings suggest that 
program participation increases the sick-listed workers‟ labor market attachment, without 
harming the labor market prospects of those program participants who are unable to complete 
the program.    
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  Finally, the findings illustrate the importance of correcting for unobserved 
heterogeneity. A comparison of the model with and without random effects shows that 
without correction for unobserved heterogeneity, the risk ratio of returning to regular working 
hours during program participation is overestimated by 20 percent. Similarly, for workers 
who have left the graded return-to-work program before returning to regular working hours, 
the subsequent risk ratio of returning to work is overestimated by 7 percent. This finding has 
important bearings on the conclusion we can make. While the positive effect during program 
participation remains significant after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the post-
program effect for workers who did not return to regular working hours during program 
participation becomes insignificant. 
 
7.1. Robustness checks 
 
We perform two checks of the robustness of our findings. First, we may underestimate the 
treatment effect because our data only comprises sick leave periods above eight weeks. Thus, 
if the graded return-to-work program has a positive employment effect, sick-listed workers 
who participated in the program before the ninth week may be underrepresented in our data, 
meaning that we underestimate the treatment effect.  To assess whether this proposition is 
correct, we re-estimate our model on a sample restricted to graded return-to-work durations 
above eight weeks (see table A2 in Appendix B). This analysis supports the assumption that 
the estimated treatment effect is a lower-bound estimate, i.e., the coefficient of the variable 
measuring the effect during program participation is 0.548 in the restricted sample and 0.430 
in the full sample. 
  Second, it is likely that some sick-listed workers experience an improvement of their 
health condition during the sick leave, thereby enabling them to participate in the graded    
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return-to-work program. If our health measures and the random effects do not fully capture 
such health developments during the sick leave, the estimated treatment effect may be 
spurious and reflect improvements in the sick-listed workers‟ health rather than a program 
effect. We therefore estimate a model with time-varying random effects. Table A3 in 
Appendix B shows the results of a model with two mass points in the equation of returning to 
regular working hours, i.e., one mass point for durations up to 15 weeks and one mass point 
for durations above 15 weeks.
6 This analysis does not support the hypothesis that health 




  In this paper we estimated the employment effects of a national graded return-to-work 
program. The program allows sick-listed workers to return to work on reduced working 
hours. When the individual‟s work ability improves, the working hours are gradually 
increased until the sick-listed worker is able to work full hours again. During program 
participation the sick-listed worker receives the normal hourly wage for the hours worked and 
sickness benefit for the hours off work. We examined whether program participation 
increases the chance of returning to regular working hours. Using combined survey and 
register data, we estimated a mixed proportional hazard rate model of program participation 
and of returning to regular working hours. To identify the treatment effect, we used the 
timing-of-event approach, assuming that the sick-listed workers are unable to anticipate the 
                                                 
6 A more comprehensive model would comprise time-varying random effects both in the equation of returning 
to regular working hours and in the equation of program enrolment. Unfortunately, we were unable to identify 
the random effect distribution for such a model. A model with time-varying random effects only in the equation 
of program enrolment yields similar results as the model without time-varying random effects (not shown).    
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exact timing of program enrolment. We argued that this assumption is fulfilled because an 
individual who is falling ill cannot forecast when his or her health condition will allow a 
graded return to work. 
  We found a significant and positive effect of the graded return-to-work program on the 
probability of returning to regular working hours. This effect supports the hypothesis that the 
program has a human capital effect, i.e., that program participation reduces or hinders a loss 
of skills and qualifications. 
  We also found an insignificant effect of having ended the program without returning to 
regular working hours. This finding suggests that the program does not reduce the future 
labor market attachment of those participants who do not complete the program. 
  Although our study is not directly comparable to other studies, our findings are in line 
with previous studies that found positive employment effects of workplace-based 
interventions (e.g., Arnetz et al. 2003) and of reduced working hours (Butler et al. 1995). Our 
study adds to this literature in two respects. The vast majority of previous studies concern 
specially designed workplace-based programs with a limited population of disabled workers. 
While these studies find that the programs yield positive employment effects, our study 
suggests that national workplace-based programs may yield similar, positive employment 
outcomes. Furthermore, our findings illustrate that non-experimental evaluations of reduced 
working hours and other workplace-based interventions may overestimate the effect of these 
measures unless the effect of unobserved variables is taken into account.  
  This study benefited from municipality-based data about payments of sickness benefits 
and case management activities. We may therefore assume that the data has a high reliability. 
However, some drawbacks should be noted. First, the outcome variable, the time until 
returning to regular working hours, was only measured indirectly from information about 
when and why payment of sickness benefit ended. Clearly, this weakness reduced the    
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reliability of the measurement. Second, the measures of the sick-listed workers‟ health were 
based on register data about the number of previous visits to general practitioners and 
specialists. The study would have benefited from baseline data about the sick-listed workers‟ 
own health assessments. Future studies with better data may therefore reduce the potentially 
omitted variable bias of the estimated treatment effect. Finally, our study population was 
restricted to workers sick-listed for more than eight weeks, a restriction that may also have 
biased the estimated treatment effect. The solution to this problem could be to collect data 
when the workers have been sick-listed for a short period, e.g., two weeks. However, doing 
so would demand a huge sample, because the lion‟s share of sick-listed workers would return 
to work shortly after inclusion in the study without having entered the program.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics. 
  Participants  Non-participants 
Variable  Mean  Std.dev  Mean  Std.dev 
Visits to general practitioner in the year before the sick leave  8.140  7.037  8.809  8.029 
Visits to specialists in the year before the sick leave  0.721  1.709  0.949  2.690 
Female (yes=1)*  0.657  0.476  0.587  0.493 
Age  44.426  9.695  43.354  10.825 
Living with spouse (yes=1)**  0.774  0.419  0.709  0.455 
Foreign citizen (yes=1)  0.026  0.161  0.042  0.200 
Primary education
 b) (yes=1)***  0.268  0.444  0.363  0.481 
Secondary education
 b) (yes=1)**  0.460  0.499  0.389  0.488 
Postsecondary education
 b) (yes=1)  0.272  0.446  0.248  0.432 
Previous employment experience since 1964 (years employed)***  19.428  9.765  17.372  10.361 
Unemployment rate in percent, 9-26
th week   5.322  1.171  5.262  1.128 
Unemployment rate in percent, 27-52
th week**
c)  5.092  1.205  5.436  1.142 
Unemployment rate in percent, 53-78
th week
d)  4.977  1.156  5.353  1.176 
Unemployment rate in percent, 79
th week+
e)  4.880  0.983  5.378  1.376 
Note: Calculations based on 265 program participants and 669 non-participants. Significance levels: *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. a): Calculation based on 176 participants and 453 
non-participants who returned to regular working hours. b): Primary education covers the compulsory school 
period, i.e., nine years of basic school, and other preparatory schooling such as high school. Secondary 
education includes all „terminal‟ educations (preparing the students for entry directly into working life) except 
university degrees. Postsecondary education includes all types of university degrees. c): Calculation based on 
107 participants and 211 non-participants with return-to-work durations longer than 26 weeks. d): Calculation 
based on 35 participants and 96 non-participants with return-to-work durations longer than 52 weeks. e): 
Calculation based on 5 participants and 36 non-participants with return-to-work durations longer than 78 weeks.    
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Table 2  
Random effects hazard rate model of participation in graded return to work and of returning 
to regular working hours. 
Variable  Graded return to work  Regular  hours 
Enrolled in graded return to work       0.430  (0.168)** 
Graded return to work completed      0.425  (0.262) 
Visits to general practitioner in the year before the sick leave  -0.018  (0.009)**  -0.034  (0.009)*** 
Visits to specialists in the year before the sick leave  -0.052  (0.032)  -0.025  (0.031) 
Female (yes=1)  0.403  (0.140)***  0.044  (0.133) 
Age  -0.027  (0.010)***  -0.024  (0.009)*** 
Living with spouse (yes=1)  0.220  (0.152)  0.030  (0.135) 
Danish citizen (yes=1)  -0.380  (0.406)  -1.516  (0.463)*** 
Secondary education  0.370  (0.154)**  -0.034  (0.137) 
Postsecondary education  0.471  (0.175)***  0.490  (0.151)*** 
Previous employment experience since 1964 (years employed)  0.038  (0.011)***  0.020  (0.010)** 
Unemployment rate   -0.116  (0.057)**  -0.482  (0.065)*** 
Baseline, period 2
a)  0.870  (0.179)***  0.703  (0.198)*** 
Baseline, period 3
a)  1.008  (0.200)***  0.419  (0.248)* 
Baseline, period 4
a)  0.079  (0.227)  -0.482  (0.282)* 
Constant  -4.310  (0.472)***  -0.768  (0.428)* 
Random effects  0.762  (0.310)**  2.735  (0.287)*** 
Fraction of observations with random effect  0.273 (0.063)*** 
Note: N=934. The hazard rate models are estimated simultaneously. See table 1 for further information about 
the variables. Significance levels: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. a): Baseline 
hazards in the equation for graded return to work: Period 1: <9 weeks, period 2: 9-12 weeks, period 3: 13-19 
weeks, period 4: >19 weeks. Baseline hazards in the equation for returning to regular working hours: Period 1: 
<13 weeks, period 2: 13-19 weeks, period 3: 20-39 weeks, period 4: >39 weeks. 
    


















































Program participants Non-participants  
Fig. 1. Unadjusted hazard rates to regular working hours for graded return-to-work 
participants and non-participants. 
 
Note: For program participants, the hazard rate in a given period, t, equals the number of persons returning to 
regular working hours in period t, divided by the number of persons who are enrolled in the program in period t 
or were enrolled before period t. For non-participants, the hazard rate in period, t, equals the number of persons 
returning to regular working hours in period t, divided by the number of persons who never participate in the 
program and of persons who enroll in the program after period t.    
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Appendix A. Proportional hazard rate model with time dependent random effects 
 
We allow the random effects to vary in predefined intervals. More specifically the random 
effects are constant in the interval (0,c) and constant in the interval (c+1, ), meaning that the 
magnitude of the random effects may differ between the two intervals. We then obtain the 
following hazard rates for the duration into graded return: 
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Note that the super-script on the random effects now designates the time interval for which 
the random effects take effect. This yields the following log-likelihood function, using the 
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Appendix B. Tables A1, A2, and A3  
Table A1  
Hazard rate model of graded return to work and returning to regular working hours  
Variable  Graded return to work  Regular hours 
Enrolled in graded return to work       0.614  (0.100)*** 
Graded return to work completed      0.492  (0.234)** 
Visits to general practitioner in the year before the sick leave  -0.017  (0.009)*  -0.022  (0.006)*** 
Visits to specialists in the year before the sick leave  -0.051  (0.031)  -0.020  (0.019) 
Female (yes=1)  0.391  (0.138)***  0.014  (0.090) 
Age  -0.026  (0.010)**  -0.012  (0.006)** 
Living with spouse (yes=1)  0.227  (0.151)  0.054  (0.096) 
Danish citizen (yes=1)  -0.312  (0.400)  -0.951  (0.304)*** 
Secondary education  0.365  (0.153)**  -0.042  (0.100) 
Postsecondary education  0.438  (0.173)**  0.278  (0.109)** 
Previous employment experience since 1964 (years employed)  0.037  (0.011)***  0.011  (0.007)* 
Unemployment rate   -0.100  (0.056)*  -0.325  (0.040)*** 
Baseline, period 2
a)  0.779  (0.174)***  -0.074  (0.103) 
Baseline, period 3
a)  0.809  (0.171)***  -0.758  (0.111)*** 
Baseline, period 4
a)  -0.188  (0.178)  -1.763  (0.161)*** 
Constant  -4.168  (0.465)***  -0.727  (0.305)** 
Note: N=934. See table 1 for further information about the variables. Significance levels: *** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  a): Baseline hazards in the equation for graded return to work: period 
1: <9  weeks, period 2: 9-12  weeks, period 3: 13-19  weeks, period 4: >19  weeks. Baseline hazards in the 
equation for returning to regular working hours: period 1: <13 weeks, period 2: 13-19 weeks, period 3: 20-39 
weeks, period 4: >39 weeks.    
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Table A2 
Random  effects  hazard  rate  model  of  graded  return  to  work  and  of  returning  to  regular 
working hours using a sample of graded return-to-work durations above eight weeks 
Variable  Graded return to work  Regular hours 
Enrolled in graded return to work       0.548  (0.169)*** 
Graded return to work completed      0.306  (0.303) 
Visits to general practitioner in the year before the sick leave  -0.017  (0.011)  -0.033  (0.010)*** 
Visits to specialists in the year before the sick leave  -0.087  (0.043)**  -0.017  (0.026) 
Female (yes=1)  0.255  (0.159)  -0.002  (0.130) 
Age  -0.013  (0.012)  -0.026  (0.010)*** 
Living with spouse (yes=1)  0.319  (0.180)*  0.047  (0.138) 
Danish citizen (yes=1)  -0.309  (0.439)  -1.638  (0.512)*** 
Secondary education  0.421  (0.179)**  -0.026  (0.141) 
Postsecondary education  0.521  (0.205)**  0.474  (0.158)*** 
Previous employment experience since 1964 (years employed)  0.029  (0.012)**  0.021  (0.010)** 
Unemployment rate   -0.097  (0.065)  -0.441  (0.066)*** 
Baseline, period 2
a)  0.057  (0.194)  0.709  (0.220)*** 
Baseline, period 3
a)  -0.920  (0.219)***  0.392  (0.267) 
Baseline, period 4
a)      -0.475  (0.299) 
Constant  -3.894  (0.553)***  -0.912  (0.445)** 
Random effects  0.354  (0.497)  2.873  (0.323)*** 
Fraction of observations with random effect  0.234 (0.120)** 
Note: N=862. The hazard rate models are estimated simultaneously. See table 1 for more information about the 
variables. Significance levels: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. a): Baseline 
hazards in the equation for graded return to work: period 1: 9-12 weeks, period 2: 13-19 weeks, period 3: >19 
weeks. Baseline hazards in the equation for returning to regular working hours: period 1: <13 weeks, period 2: 
13-19 weeks, period 3: 20-39 weeks, period 4: >39 weeks.    
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Table A3 
Hazard rate model with time-varying random effects 
Variable  Graded return to work  Regular hours 
Enrolled in graded return to work       0.461  (0.176)*** 
Graded return to work completed      0.447  (0.264)* 
Visits to general practitioner in the year before the sick leave  -0.018  (0.009)**  -0.032  (0.009)*** 
Visits to specialists in the year before the sick leave  -0.054  (0.032)*  -0.038  (0.033) 
Female (yes=1)  0.401  (0.139)***  0.028  (0.129) 
Age  -0.027  (0.010)***  -0.023  (0.009)** 
Living with spouse (yes=1)  0.219  (0.152)  0.022  (0.136) 
Danish citizen (yes=1)  -0.376  (0.405)  -1.356  (0.423)*** 
Secondary education  0.373  (0.154)**  -0.013  (0.137) 
Postsecondary education  0.470  (0.176)***  0.493  (0.153)*** 
Previous employment experience since 1964 (years employed)  0.038  (0.011)***  0.019  (0.010)* 
Unemployment rate   -0.120  (0.058)**  -0.484  (0.064)*** 
Baseline, period 2
a)  0.862  (0.179)***  0.758  (0.203)*** 
Baseline, period 3
a)  0.988  (0.201)***  0.467  (0.246)* 
Baseline, period 4
a)  0.056  (0.232)  -0.433  (0.283) 
Constant  -4.281  (0.471)***  -0.878  (0.431)** 
Random effects, graded return to work  0.695  (0.328)**     
Random effects, regular working hours before the 16
th week      2.750  (0.306)*** 
Random effects, regular working hours after the 16
th  week      2.114  (0.465)*** 
Fraction of observations with random effect  0.290 (0.090)*** 
Note: N=934. The hazard rate models are estimated simultaneously. See table 1 for further information about 
the variables. Significance levels: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. a): Baseline 
hazards in the equation for graded return to work: Period 1: <9 weeks, period 2: 9-12 weeks, period 3: 13-19 
weeks, period 4: >19 weeks. Baseline hazards in the equation for returning to regular working hours: Period 1: 
<13 weeks, period 2: 13-19 weeks, period 3: 20-39 weeks, period 4: >39 weeks.    
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